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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had an active
trademark docket in 2015. The Federal Circuit issued a total of
fifteen trademark decisions,' eleven of which were designated as
1. In re Tam (Tam Ill), 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc); Edge Sys.,
LLC v. Aguila, No. 2015-1507, 2015 WL 9267529 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21, 2015); Jack
Wolfskin Ausriistung ffir Draussen GmbH v. New Millennium Sports, 797 F.3d 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 982 (2016); In re Louisiana Fish Fry Prods.,
797 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Staub Design, LLC v. Carnivale, 625 F. App'x 993
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters., LLC, 794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2015); M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 15-777, 2016 WL
1078934 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2016); Beling v. Ennis, Inc., 613 F. App'x 924 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 406 (2015); Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America,
Inc., 786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Tam (Tam Hl), 600 F. App'x 775 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (per curiam); In re Trivita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Southco, Inc. v.
Fivetech Tech., Inc., 611 F. App'x 681 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 587 (2015);
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precedential,2 including one en banc decision.' This is a noticeable
increase in precedential decisions from years past4 and the first en
banc trademark decision issued in many years.'
Of the fifteen trademark decisions, eleven primarily involved
substantive issues, and the remaining four focused mainly on procedural
issues. The cases consist of appeals from the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (TTAB or Board) and from federal district courts.
The Federal Circuit's final decision of 2015 was its most significant.
Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit overturned its prior decision in In
re Tam (Tam 1),' which affirmed the TTAB's refusal to register the
mark THE SLANTS on grounds that the mark is disparaging.' As
detailed below, the Federal Circuit's en banc decision held for the first
time that the disparagement portion of section 2(a) of the Lanham
Act violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' This
decision will likely impact the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's
(USPTO) future examination procedures under section 2(a), and it
Couture v. Playdom, Inc., 778 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 88 (2015);
In re The Newbridge Cutlery Co., 776 F.3d 854 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
2. Tam III, 808 F.3d 1321; Jack Wolfskin, 797 F.3d 1363; In re Louisiana Fish Fry
Prods., 797 F.3d 1332;juice Generation, Inc., 794 F.3d 1334; M.Z. Berger & Co., 787 F.3d
1368; Apple Inc., 786 F.3d 983; Princeton Vanguard, LLC, 786 F.3d 960; Tam II, 600 F.
App'x 775; In re Trivita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872; Couture, 778 F.3d 1379; In re The Newbridge
Cutlery Co., 776 F.3d 854.
3. Tam III, 808 F.3d 1321.
4. SeeJonathan M. Gelchinsky, 2014 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit,
64 AM. U. L. REv. 967, 968 (2015) (six precedential trademark decisions in 2014);
Anita B. Polott & Dana N. Justus, 2013 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 63
AM. U. L. REv. 1419, 1436 (2014) (two precedential trademark decisions in 2013);
Molly R. Silfen et al., 2012 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 62 AM. U. L.
REv. 991, 992 (2013) (eleven precedential trademark decisions in 2012); Marynelle
Wilson & Antigone Peyton, 2011 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 61 AM.
U. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2012) (two precedential trademark decisions in 2011); Susan
B. Flohr et al., 2010 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REv:
1159, 1160-61 (2011) (eight precedential trademark decisions in 2010).
5. See Stephen R. Baird, Review of the 1999 Trademark Law Decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1321, 1370-72 (2000)
(discussing the last en banc trademark decision before 2015, Midwest Indus., Inc.
v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc), which was
decided in 1999).
6. 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
7. Id. at 568.
8. Tam III, 808 F.3d at 1327-28; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012); see also infra
Section I.A (detailing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's en banc
decision in Tam III).
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may also have a bearing on other pending cases involving this section
of the Lanham Act.
This Article reviews all of the Federal Circuit's 2015 trademark
decisions in detail below and groups the decisions according to the
primary issues in each case.
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Disparagement
1. In re Tam
In Tam I, Simon Shiao Tam, the "'front man' for Asian-American
dance rock band[,] The Slants," initially applied to register the mark
THE SLANTS for entertainment services.' His first application for
the word mark THE SLANTS used specimens featuring Asian
motifs.0 The Examining Attorney refused registration of the mark
under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, as a disparaging mark." Tam
then filed a second application, which was the subject of this case."
The specimens submitted with the second application did not
include Asian motifs, but the Examining Attorney again refused
registration on disparagement grounds under section 2(a), and the
Board affirmed the refusal."
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Tam argued that the TTAB erred
in finding THE SLANTS mark disparaging.4 As an initial matter,
Tam argued that the TTAB erred in relying on the evidence gathered
by the Examining Attorney during the examination of the initial
trademark application." However, the court held that such evidence
was properly considered because the Examining Attorney can look at
evidence outside of the application during examination."
6
9. 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
10. Id. at 568, 570 (noting that the band's website featured the mark next to "a
depiction of an Asian woman . rising sun imagery and ... a stylized dragon
image").
11. Id. at 568.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 569.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 966-69 (Fed. Cir.
2007)) (allowing the Examining Attorney to rely on dictionary definitions, Internet
search results, and newspaper articles to determine the relevant purchasing public's
comprehension of a word).
[Vol. 65:10271030
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Turning to the substantive grounds of refusal, the Federal Circuit
applied a two-part test it developed in In re Geller" to determine whether
a mark is disparaging." Under this test, the Board must consider:
(1) what is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into
account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of
the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the
goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the
marketplace in connection with the goods or services; and
(2) if that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons,
institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning may be
disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.19
Under the first part of the test, the Federal Circuit found
substantial evidence supporting the TTAB's finding that the mark
THE SLANTS likely refers to people of Asian descent.2 o The court
noted that although there are a number of meanings for the word
"slants," including innocuous meanings, that fact "does not foreclose
the possibility that the term may also be used in an offensive manner,
even when the non-disparaging meanings are more common."2 1
Under the second part of the test, the Federal Circuit found ample
evidence that the word "slant" is "disparaging, offensive, or an ethnic
slur when used to refer to someone of Asian descent."2 2
On appeal, Tam also challenged the constitutionality of Lanham
Act section 2(a), arguing that restrictions on disparaging trademarks
are unconstitutional under the First Amendment because the grant
of the benefit-a trademark registration-is conditioned upon the
restraint of speech under section 2(a) .2' The court found that this
argument was foreclosed by its precedent in In re McGinley," in which
17. 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming the Board's rejection of the
mark "STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA," based on substantial evidence
that "associating peaceful political Islamisation with terrorism would be disparaging
to a substantial composite of American Muslims"), cert. denied sub nom. Geller v. PTO,
135 S. Ct. 944 (2015).
18. Tam 1, 785 F.3d at 569.
19. Id. (quoting In re Gellar, 751 F.3d at 1358).
20. Id. at 570.
21. Id. (noting that "the existence of... other meanings makes it necessary to
examine how the applicant uses the mark in the marketplace to determine its
likely meaning").
22. Id. at 571.
23. Id.
24. 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding that the "appellant's First
Amendment rights would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark").
2016] 1031
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it found that "the PTO's refusal to register appellant's mark does not
affect his right to use it. "25
Tam raised other constitutional challenges based on vagueness, the
Due Process clause, and the Equal Protection clause.2 ' The Federal
Circuit rejected each of these challenges and affirmed the Board's
decision to refuse registration to THE SLANTS mark.
At the conclusion of the decision, Judge Kimberly Ann Moore
noted that it was time for the Federal Circuit to revisit its decision in
In re McGinley." On April 27, 2015, seven days after issuing Tam I, the
Federal Circuit sua sponte vacated the decision and scheduled an en
banc hearing to focus on whether the section 2(a) bar on registering
disparaging marks violates the First Amendment, giving the court the
opportunity to revisit its In re McGinley holding. 21
On December 22, 2015, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled
the disparagement portion of section 2(a) of the Lanham Actso to be
unconstitutional." Judge Moore, writing for the majority, again
stated that it was time for the Federal Circuit to revisit its precedent
under McGinley because "the McGinley analysis was cursory, without
citation to legal authority, and decided at a time when the First
Amendment had only recently been applied to commercial speech,"
and the protection afforded to commercial speech had "evolved
significantly" since McGinley.12 Judge Moore's thorough sixty-two-
page decision detailed why section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violates
the First Amendment.
The court first explained that trademark registration is significant
and affords numerous benefits to owners of trademark registrations.33
In particular, registration offers: (1) "the right to exclusive
nationwide use of that mark where there was no prior use by others,"
(2) a presumption of the mark's validity, (3) the right to sue in
federal court to enforce the trademark, (4) potential recovery of
25. Tam I, 785 F.3d at 572 (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484).
26. Id. at 572-73.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 573, 580 (Moore, J., additional views) (stating that the court had failed,
in McGinley and other cases, to analyze whether section 2(a) imposes
"unconstitutional conditions" on free speech).
29. Tam II, 600 F. App'x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
31. Tam III, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
32. Id. at 1333-34.
33. Id. at 1328.
[Vol. 65:10271032
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treble damages if the owner can show infringement was willful, and
(5) the federal government's assistance in preventing infringing or
counterfeit goods from entering the United States.
The Federal Circuit determined that section 2(a) was subject to
strict scrutiny because it denied rights to private speech based on
content and viewpoint. The court explained that under strict
scrutiny, "[c]ontent-based laws-those that target speech based on its
communicative content-are presumptively unconstitutional and
may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interests."" The Federal Circuit
found that section 2(a) applied based on the particular topic and
conveyed message and is, therefore, a content-based law." In
particular, the court noted that the USPTO "reject[ed] marks under
§ 2(a) when it [found] the marks refer[red] to a group in a negative
way, but it permit[ted] the registration of marks that refer[red] to a
group in a positive, non-disparaging manner.""
The Federal Circuit rejected each of the government's many
arguments that section 2(a) should not be subject to strict scrutiny.
First, the government argued that section 2(a) regulated commercial
speech, which is not subject to strict scrutiny."9 However, the court
pointed out that the disparagement provision in section 2(a) was
directed at the expressive component of the speech, not the
commercial component."
Second, the government argued that section 2(a) prohibited no
speech because Tam was free to choose whatever name he wanted for
his band and could use that name in commerce.4 1 The court rejected
this argument, noting that the way in which section 2(a) burdens
34. Id. at 1328-29.
35. Id. at 1334.
36. Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)).
37. Id. at 1335.
38. Id. at 1336.
39. Id. at 1337-38.
40. Id. at 1338 (explaining that when regulations affect speech with a dual
character-such as commercial and expressive speech-the applicable First
Amendment standard depends on the aspect of the speech being targeted by the
regulation, and that here, section 2(a) was directed at the expressive component of
speech about a public concern rather than commercial speech, which involves
information such as who produces and sells a certain product).
41. Id. at 1339.
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speech is tantamount to a restriction.12 In addition, the court noted
that a federal trademark registration "bestows truly significant and
financially valuable benefits upon markholders"4 ' and "[d]enial of
these benefits creates a serious disincentive to adopt a mark which
the government may deem offensive or disparaging.""
Third, the government argued that trademark registration is
government speech and is outside the scope of the First Amendment.45
Rejecting this argument as "meritless," the Federal Circuit pointed
out that the manifestations of government registration (i.e., the
registrant's right to attach the @ symbol to the registered mark, the
mark's placement on the Principal Register, the issuance of a
certificate of registration) do not convert the underlying speech to
government speech.4 6
Fourth, the government argued that section 2(a)'s message-based
discrimination is tantamount to a government subsidy, and therefore,
exempt from strict scrutiny." The court rejected this argument as
well, finding that cases dealing with subsidies have never been extended
to the "benefit" that is bestowed on the owner of a federal trademark.4 8
The court declined to find that a trademark is a subsidy because
although a trademark registration is valuable, it is not monetary.4 9
After firmly rejecting each of the government's arguments against
application of the strict scrutiny standard, the Federal Circuit found
that, even if it were to analyze section 2(a) under intermediate
scrutiny as a regulation of commercial speech, section 2(a) would fail
this lower standard of review as well." To survive the intermediate
scrutiny standard for the regulation of commercial speech: (1) the
regulated speech must concern lawful activity and must not be
misleading; (2) the asserted government interest must be substantial;
and (3) the regulation must be narrowly tailored and directly
42. See id. at 1340 (noting that section 2(a) indirectly burdens speech based on
its content by burdening some speakers and benefitting others).
43. Id. at 1340.
44. Id. at 1341.
45. Id. at 1345.
46. Id. at 1345-46.
47. Id. at 1348, 1350 (explaining that the government can impose a message-
based discriminatory condition on government funds granted to establish a program
to define that program's limits).
48. Id. at 1351.
49. Id. at 1353 (explaining that a "registered trademark redefines the nature of
the markholder's rights as against the rights of other citizens").
50. Id. at 1355.
1034 [Vol. 65:1027
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advance the asserted government interest.5' However, in reviewing
Tam I, the Federal Circuit did not think that the government
presented a substantial government interest as justification for
section 2(a)'s bar on disparaging marks, noting that "[a]ll of the
government's proffered interests boil down to permitting the
government to burden speech it finds offensive."5 2
In closing, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that "invalidating
[section 2(a)] may lead to the wider registration of marks that offend
vulnerable communities," but explained that many other First
Amendment decisions also protected hurtful speech and that the First
Amendment affords such protections so as not to "stifle public debate."53
In response to the Federal Circuit's significant decision in this case,
which would have far-reaching effects on trademark examination
procedure if implemented, the USPTO has temporarily suspended all
action on pending applications involving marks subject to potential
refusal based on disparagement grounds under section 2(a). In
addition, on April 20, 2016 the USPTO filed a petition for writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting that the Court
review and reverse the Federal Circuit's decision that section 2(a) is
unconstitutional. At the time of publication, the Supreme Court
51. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
52. Id. at 1357.
53. Id. at 1357-58 (noting that even speech "inflict[ing] great pain" is protected).





55. Tam III, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Lee v. Tam,
No. 15-1293 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2016). Counsel for Pro-Football, Inc., the owner of the
REDSKINS trademark registrations for the Redskins NFL team followed suit on April
25, 2016, filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court of Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1311 (U.S.
Apr. 26, 2016). Following the TTAB's 2014 decision to cancel the REDSKINS
trademark registrations as disparaging under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, in
2015, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia affirmed the TTAB
decision on the same grounds and Pro-Football appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439
(E.D. Va. 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). Although the
Fourth Circuit appeal is ongoing, Pro-Football filed the petition for writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari
because the Pro-Football case involves complementary issues to In re Tam. Pro-Football,
Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1311 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2016).
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was still considering the USPTO's petition and had not granted or
denied certiorari.
B. Use in Commerce
1. Southco, Inc. v. Fivetech Technology Inc.
In Southco, Inc. v. Fivetech Technology, Inc.," Southco sued Fivetech
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for infringing its patents and
trademarks for captive screws, a type of fastener used to attach two
parts to one another." Southco owned two trademark registrations
for designs used on the knob of their captive screws,58 and Southco
claimed that Fivetech's captive screw knob design was similar to
Southco's design marks.5 ' Both companies' designs are shown in
Figure 1 below. Fivetech moved for summary judgment, arguing that
it had not infringed Southco's knob design marks because it had not
used Southco's marks in commerce."
Figure 1. Marks at Issue in Southco, Inc. v. Fivetech Technology Inc."




'153 Trademark '685 Trademark I FivetecWs Mark
56. 611 F. App'x 681 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
57. Id. at 682.
58. Id. at 691.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 692; see 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a) (2012) (providing that that the Lanham
Act applies to the "use in commerce" of "any ... registered mark ... with which such
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive").
61. Southco, 611 F. App'x at 691.
NIX
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In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Southco
argued that Fivetech had in fact used its mark in commerce in
connection with the captive screw product by: (1) depicting the
Fivetech screw in a catalog on Fivetech's website; (2) filing a
trademark application for Fivetech's design of a screw knob, in which
Fivetech stated the mark was "first used in commerce at least as early
as 03/10/2010, and is now in use in such commerce;" and (3)
identifying the Fivetech screw products in a quotation list submitted
to a customer in the United States.12
The district court granted Fivetech's motion for summary
judgment and the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that none of the
evidence presented by Southco proved that Fivetech used its mark in
commerce.3 In particular, the Federal Circuit found that (1) the
catalog alone was not sufficient evidence to prove use in commerce;
(2) the trademark application was not a use in commerce without
evidence that Fivetech shipped its screws to the United States; and
(3) the quotation list was not sufficient to show that Fivetech's screws
were ever shipped into the United States."
2. Couture v. Playdom, Inc.
In Couture v. Playdom, Inc.," the Federal Circuit affirmed the
TTAB's decision to cancel a service mark on the ground that the
underlying application was void ab initio.' On May 30, 2008, the
appellant, David Couture, filed a use-based application for the service
mark PLAYDOM covering various entertainment, education, and
script writing services." In his application, the appellant claimed use
of his PIAYDOM mark in connection with all of the identified
services since the application filing date.6 8 In support of his use-based
application, the appellant submitted a single screenshot of a webpage
(shown below), which was created on the filing date of his application
and included the following text: "[w]elcome to Playdomlnc.com.
62. Id. at 692.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 692-93.
65. 778 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 88 (2015). The authors and
Kelly IP LLP represented Playdom in the TTAB decision and in the appeal to the
Federal Circuit.
66. Id. at 1382 (explaining that a person or entity must render services under a mark
before seeking recognition from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)).
67. Id. at 1380.
68. Id.
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We are proud to offer writing and production services for motion
picture film, television, and new media. Please feel free to contact us
if you are interested: playdominc@gmail.com," and "[wiebsite
[u] nder [c] onstruction."" The mark was registered in 2009.
Figure 2. Mark at Issue in Couture v. Playdom, Inc.7
Playdom
The appellee, Playdom, Incorporated, filed a petition to cancel the
registration of appellant's PLAYDOM mark, arguing it was void ab
initio because appellant had not rendered any services under the
mark in commerce as of the filing date of his use-based application."
In particular, appellee argued that services must have been actually
rendered by the filing date of a use-based application to constitute
the technical use of a service mark required under the Lanham Act to
support a use-based service mark application. 7 Further, appellee
argued that advertising and promotional activities undertaken before
69. Id.
70. Petitioner's Reply Trial Brief at 7, Playdom, Inc. v. Couture, 2013 WL
8213084 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 20 2013) (No. 92051115).
71. Id.
72. Brief & Supplemental Appendix of Appellee at 19-23, Couture v. Playdom,
Inc., No. 2014-1480 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2014); see aso Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
1051(a) (2012) (stating that an applicant of a use-based trademark application
must use the mark in commerce or in connection with all the goods and services
listed in the application as of the application filing date).
[Vol. 65:10271038
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the actual rendering of the recited services do not constitute the
rendering of services and "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act."
In response, the appellant argued that his website, business cards,
and email addresses constituted offering of services, which he argued
should be sufficient to support registration as of the filing date of his
application." He also maintained that using the PLAYDOM mark on
the Internet constituted use in commerce."
The Board granted the cancellation, holding that the Lanham Act
requires an applicant to demonstrate technical use of a mark by
rendering services under the mark before filing his use-based
application." The TTAB also found that merely posting a website page
and advertising readiness, willingness, and ability to render services was
not sufficient to qualify as rendering services as of the filing date."
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board, holding that an
applicant only uses a mark in commerce by both (1) using or
displaying the mark to sell or advertise services and (2) actually
rendering services under the mark, before filing the use-based
application. In this case, the court determined that there was no
evidence that the appellant actually rendered services to any
customer before 2010, and thus the cancellation was appropriate.9
The court found that merely offering services, without the actual
provision of the services, is insufficient to constitute use in commerce
under the Lanham Act." The court had not previously "directly
address[ed] whether the offering of a service, without the actual
provision of a service, is sufficient to constitute use in commerce
under Lanham Act § 45."'l
73. Brief of Appellee, supra note 72, at 20; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining "use
in commerce" as the "bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and
not made merely to reserve a right in a mark").
74. Corrected Appellant's Opening Brief with Appendix, at 4-6 n.2, Couture v.
Playdom, Inc., No. 14-1480 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2014).
75. Id. at 6, 9.
76. Couture v. Playdom, Inc., 778 F.3d 1379, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
77. Id. at 1381-82.
78. Id.
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C. Bona Fide Intent to Use
1. M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG
In M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG," the Federal Circuit focused on
the legal and evidentiary standards necessary to prove that an
applicant had a bona fide intent to use a mark in commerce in
affirming the TTAB's decision to refuse registration for the
applicant's IWATCH mark."
Swatch filed a Notice of Opposition to oppose the registration of
M.Z. Berger's intent-to-use application for the IWATCH mark for
watches, clocks, and various other related goods.84 Swatch argued
that M.Z. Berger lacked a bona fide intent to use the IWATCH mark,
and the Board agreed, sustaining Swatch's opposition."
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered for the first time
"whether [the] lack of a bona fide intent is [the] proper statutory
grounds on which to challenge a trademark application."" The court
agreed with the TTAB, finding that "[a] n opposer is 'entitled to rely
on any statutory ground which negates appellant's right to the subject
registration,"' and because a bona fide intent to use a mark in
commerce is a statutory requirement for an intent-to-use application,
an opposer may use the lack of a bona fide intent to challenge the
registration of a trademark application."
Turning to whether M.Z. Berger had a bona fide intent to use the
IWATCH mark at the time it filed its application, the court held that
M.Z. Berger merely had to show that its "intent to use the mark was
firm and not merely [an] intent to reserve a right in the mark," and
that the TTAB can view all of the evidence presented as a whole when
determining whether the applicant met that standard." During its
proceeding, the TTAB considered evidence from M.Z. Berger
employees-which the TTAB concluded "failed to tell a consistent
story about the company's intent at the time the application was
filed"-and evidence that M.Z. Berger did not take any steps to
commercialize the IWATCH product, such as creating mockups of the
82. 787 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
83. Id. at 1378-79.
84. Id. at 1370-71.
85. Id. at 1371, 1373.
86. Id. at 1375.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1376.
[Vol. 65:10271040
2015 TRADEMARK LAw DECISIONS
watches and clocks to be used with the 1WATCH mark." Based on the
evidence presented, the TTAB held that M.Z. Berger did not have a
bona fide intent to use the mark at the time of the application."
On appeal, Berger argued that it satisfied the low standard for
intent and that the Board improperly discounted the evidence it
presented.91 However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's
decision, noting that the TTAB properly considered all of the
evidence presented-evidence that both supported and undermined
M.Z. Berger's argument-and that substantial evidence supported
the Board's conclusion that M.Z. Berger lacked the requisite bona
fide intent to use the mark in commerce.92
D. Likelihood of Confusion
1. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC
In Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC," the opposer GS
Enterprises ("GS") owned four registrations that each featured the
phrase PEACE & LOVE-including the two design marks shown in
Figure 3 below-and were used in connection with restaurant services.94
Figure 3. GS Enterprises'Marks in Issue injuice Generation, Inc. v. GS
Enterprises LLC"
GS opposed Juice Generation's application to register a design
mark (shown in Figure 4 below), which consisted of the words
PEACE LOVE AND JUICE, for juice bar services."6
89. Id. at 1371-72.
90. Id. at 1377.
91. Id. at 1376.
92. Id. at 1377-79.
93. 794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
94. Id. at 1336.
95. Id.
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Figure 4. juice Generation's Mark in Issue injuice Generation, Inc. v. GS
Enterprises LLC17
GS successfully argued to the TTAB that Juice Generation's
applied-for logo was likely to cause confusion with GS's PEACE &
LOVE marks for related services." In assessing the similarity of the
parties' marks, the TTAB identified the words "PEACE LOVE" in
Juice Generation's logo as the dominant portion of the mark, found
that the word 'JUICE" was generic and had been disclaimed, and
concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks."
However, the Federal Circuit vacated the Board's decision and
remanded for an opinion consistent with the court's findings.'o In
particular, the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB did not give
adequate consideration to evidence of third-party use of PEACE AND
LOVE and did not properly consider Juice Generation's PEACE
LOVE AND JUICE logo as a whole.' The Federal Circuit noted that
Juice Generation submitted evidence of a number of registered and
unregistered third-party marks containing the words "peace" and
"love" followed by a third word identifying the product.0 2 The TTAB
discounted this evidence because Juice Generation had not provided
evidence of these third-party marks' use in sales or promotional
efforts, or the marks' impact on the purchasing public."' However,
96. Id. (noting thatJuice Generation's application disclaimed the word 'JUICE").
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1336-37.
99. Id. at 1337.
100. Id. at 1341-42.
101. Id. at 1338.
102. Id. at 1339.
103. Id.
[Vol. 65:10271042
2015 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS
the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB overlooked that the
evidence of third-party marks presented by Juice Generation could
also be relevant to show that "some segment of the composite marks
which both contesting parties use has a normally understood and
well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the
conclusion that that segment is relatively weak."' Therefore, the
court reversed and remanded for the TTAB to consider evidence
about the third-party marks, the strength of GS's mark, and the
likelihood of confusion that would result if Juice Generation's mark
registered would generate confusion.0 ' The Federal Circuit also
found the TTAB's analysis of Juice Generation's mark was
"inadequate."'0 Specifically, the court noted that while the TTAB
did not err by giving less emphasis to the word "JUICE," "it must still
view the mark as a whole."0 7
2. Jack Wolfskin Ausristung fur Draussen GmbH v. New Millennium Sports
In Jack Wolfskin Ausriistung fir Draussen GmbH v. New Millennium
Sports,0 sJack Wolfskin applied to register a design mark of an angled
paw print (shown in Figure 5 below) for its clothing, footwear, and
accessory products.o'
Figure 5. Jack Wolfskin's Mark in Issue in New Millennium Sports" 0
104. Id. (quoting 2 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:90
(4th ed. 2015) (quoting Standard Brands, Inc. v. RJR Foods, Inc., 192 U.S.P.O. 383
(T.T.A.B. 1976))).
105. Id. at 1340.
106. Id. at 1341.
107. Id.; see also In re Nat'l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(explaining that as long as the TTAB's conclusion rests on consideration of the
entire mark, it is not improper, for rational reasons, to state that more or less weight
has been afforded to a particular feature of a mark).
108. 797 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
109. Id. at 1366.
110. Id.
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New Millennium opposed the registration, citing its own registered
mark for the word KELME next to a paw print (shown in Figure 6
below) for clothing products."' Jack Wolfskin filed a counterclaim
for cancellation alleging that New Millennium abandoned its mark
because it stopped using the registered version and began using a
modified or modernized version (also shown in Figure 6)."
Figure 6. New Millennium's Marks in Issue in New Millennium Sports"'
KELME KELME *
The TTAB rejected Jack Wolfskin's counterclaim, finding that New
Millennium had continuously used its mark, or a version that was not a
"material alteration," and it sustained New Millennium's opposition
againstJack Wolfskin's mark on the ground of likelihood of confusion."4
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the Board's finding
of a likelihood of confusion between the marks and reversed the
Board's decision refusing the registration to Jack Wolfskin."' The
court found that the Board failed to properly compare New
Millennium's mark as a whole to. Jack Wolfskin's mark.""' In
particular, the TTAB essentially disregarded the dominant word
portion of New Millennium's mark, even though none of the
evidence conclusively established that the paw print alone was used
for source identification."' The court reasoned that when a mark
consists of both words and a design, the word portion of the mark is
the one most likely to indicate the origin of the goods."' The TTAB
also failed to recognize the relatively narrow scope of protection
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1369-70.
114. Id. at 1367.
115. Id. at 1374.
116. Id. at 1366.
117. Id. at 1372.
118. Id. at 1371.
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afforded to marks involving paw prints, given the extensive evidence
of paw prints in third party registrations and usage for clothing."'
However, the court agreed with the Board that New Millennium
did not abandon its mark by using a slightly modified version; the
court noted that this was an established practice called "tacking,"
which preserves the rights in mark.'" The court explained that the
TTAB must consider whether the markholder had so "substantially
altered" the mark that it created a different commercial
impression."' To avoid abandoning its registration, the trademark
owner can only make modifications such that the modified version
maintains the "same, continuous commercial impression."'2 In the
present case, New Millennium only altered the font of the "KELME"
element of its mark and the style of the paw print, which the TTAB
found to be "minor stylistic alterations."123 The court agreed, finding
minor adjustments to the font not sufficient to warrant a finding that
consumers would view these as different marks.124
E. Trade Dress
1. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.
Samsung appealed from a final judgment in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California after a long-running dispute,
where the jury initially awarded Apple nearly $640 million in
damages.125 On a partial retrial, another jury reduced Apple's award
to $290 million based on findings that Samsung infringed Apple's
trade dress, design patents, and utility patents.'2 1 In addition, the
jury in the district court case found that Samsung's products were
likely to dilute the trade dress of Apple's iPhone.2 1
Apple claimed that elements of its iPhone 3G and 3GS products
were protected by common law trade dress of "a rectangular product
with four evenly rounded corners; a flat, clear surface covering the
119. Id. at 1373-74.
120. Id. at 1367, 1370.
121. Id. at 1369.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1370.
124. Id. (noting that the "KELME" portion still "appear [ed] in all capital, block
style letter[s]" and the mark still consisted of the literal paw print design).
125. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
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front of the product; a display screen under the clear surface,"'1
2 and
that certain elements on the home screen were protected by a federally
registered trademark.129 On appeal, Samsung argued that Apple's trade
dress was functional and therefore not protectable trademark law.s
0
The Federal Circuit applied Ninth Circuit law,"' which had a "high
bar for non-functionality."13 2 The court found that Apple failed to
present substantial evidence of non-functionality of the unregistered
trade dress'33 because: (1) the design serves a utilitarian advantage
because the rounded corners improve "pocketability" and
"durability"'34; (2) there were no alternative designs that showed the
exact same features as the asserted trade dress'; (3) Apple's advertising
hinted at utilitarian advantages of the trade dress features, which was
enough to weigh in favor of functionality3 1; and (4) Apple provided no
evidence to show that the design elements that were the subject of its
trade dress were not relatively simple or inexpensive to manufacture.13
Regarding Apple's registered trade dress, the Federal Circuit
thought it was "clear" that individual elements claimed in the
registration were functional.'" Despite Apple's argument that
Samsung was improperly disaggregating individual elements of the
trade dress, the court found that Apple "offer [ed] no analysis of the icon
designs" claimed by the trade dress registration"' and that there was not
substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's finding.1
0 As a
128. Id.at 992.
129. Id. at 995.
130. Opening Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 14, 16, Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 2014-1335, -1368), 2014 WL 2586819,
at *14, *16; see Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 991 (explaining that a "functional" feature has
some use or purpose or positively affects the product's cost or quality).
131. Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 991 (citing Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Const. Mach.
Co., 668 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 2012); Talking Rain Beverage Co. v. S. Beach
Beverage Co., 349 F.3d 601, 602 (9th Cir. 2003); Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp.,
296 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2002); Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. v. Cooper Indus.,
199 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1999)).
132. Id. at 992.
133. See id. at 992 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (4) (A)) (explaining that the party
asserting that the trade dress is not functional carries the burden of proof).
134. Id. at 992-93.
135. Id. at 993.
136. Id. at 993-94.
137. Id. at 994.
138. Id. at 995.
139. Id. at 995-96.
140. Id. at 996.
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result, the Federal Circuit reversed the jury's verdict that Apple's
unregistered and registered trade dress rights were protectable.14 1
F. Primarily Geographically Descriptive
1. In re The Newbridge Cutlery Co.
In In re The Newbridge Cutlery Co.,14 1 the Federal Circuit, in a
thorough decision discussing the legislative history of the treatment
of geographical names under federal trademark law, reversed the
USPTO's refusal to register the mark NEWBRIDGE HOME, finding
that the mark was not primarily geographically descriptive.143
The Newbridge Cutlery Company, an Irish company based in
Newbridge, Ireland, sought U.S. trademark registration of its mark
NEWBRIDGE HOME for silverware, jewelry, desk items, and
kitchenware.'" The Examining Attorney refused registration, finding
that NEWBRIDGE HOME was primarily geographically descriptive of
Newbridge, Ireland because Newbridge is a generally known
geographic place and the goods originated in Newbridge."'5 In
addition, the Examiner found that the word "home" in the mark did
not affect the geographic significance of the term Newbridge.4 6
On appeal, the TTAB affirmed the Examining Attorney's refusal,
holding that Newbridge, Ireland is generally known to the public
based on evidence that it is "the second largest town in County
Kildare and the seventeenth largest in the Republic of Ireland; [that]
it is listed in the Columbia Gazetteer of the World; and [that] it appears
on a number of websites ... and tourism websites that advertise the
location as a 'large commercial town."""
In its reversal, the Federal Circuit found that there was not
substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that
Newbridge, Ireland is a place generally known to the relevant
American public.' The court explained that a mark is geographically
descriptive if "(1) 'the mark sought to be registered is the name of a
place known generally to the public;' ... (2) the public would make a
141. Id. at 996.
142. 776 F.3d 854 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
143. Id. at 856, 859.
144. Id. at 856-57.
145. Id. at 857, 861-62.
146. Id. at 861-62.
147. Id. at 862.
148. Id. at 863.
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goods/place association, i.e., believe that the goods for which the mark
is sought to be registered originate in that place;""' and (3) "the source
of the goods is the geographic region named in the mark."'
Starting with the first part of the test, the court looked to the
evidence relied on by the Examining Attorney and the Board to
refuse registration."' The court pointed out that the size of the town
"reveals nothing about what the relevant American purchaser might
perceive the word 'Newbridge' to mean."" The court discounted
evidence of Internet websites showing Newbridge, Ireland, noting
that websites alone do not paint the whole picture of consumers'
understanding of a particular location, and cautioned the USPTO
from relying on such evidence exclusively when determining whether
a location is "generally known."'' After examining the entirety of the
evidence presented by the Examining Attorney, the court found that
Newbridge, Ireland, is not generally known to the relevant American
public and therefore "the mark 'NEWBRIDGE' is not primarily
geographically descriptive of the goods."'54
G. Descriptiveness
1. In re TriVita, Inc.
In In re TriVita, Inc.,'"' the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's
refusal to register the applicant's NOPALEA mark for dietary and
nutritional supplements containing nopal juice, finding the mark was
"merely descriptive" of the applicant's goods.' In affirming the
Examining Attorney's rejection of TriVita's application as merely
descriptive, the Board found that nopalea is the name of a genus of
cactus that is used in food and supplements."' In addition, the
Board found that nopal and nopalea are used interchangeably to
describe this type of cactus.158
149. Id. at 860 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 861 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 861-62.
152. Id. at 862.
153. Id. at 863.
154. Id. at 864.
155. 783 F.3d 872 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
156. Id. at 876.
157. Id. at 873-74.
158. Id.
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The Board's finding that NOPALEA was merely descriptive is a
factual finding that is reviewed for support by substantial evidence on
appeal.'" The Federal Circuit rejected each of TriVita's arguments
on appeal. First, TriVita argued that the Board should have
compared "nopalea" to "nopal" because the addition of the "ea" at
the end of "nopalea" makes the mark substantially different in sight
and sound from "nopal."'" However, the Federal Circuit found that
these terms are not substantially different because "nopalea" is the
name of a genus which contained the "nopal" cactus."' Second,
TriVita argued that the average consumer is not sophisticated
enough to distinguish between the botanical meaning of nopalea and
nopal, but the court rejected this argument based on "abundant
evidence, scientific and non-scientific, of the words 'nopalea' and
'nopal' being used interchangeably."' Finally, the court rejected
TriVita's argument that the TTAB's application of American Aloe Cop.
v. Aloe Crime Laboratories, Inc.,"' was misplaced, noting that the TTAB
appropriately applied the principle from that case, namely that a
trademark applicant cannot appropriate a "generic name of the
distinguishing and effective ingredient in its product.""' The Federal
Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board's
findings and affirmed the Board's decision that NOPALEA is not
registrable for TriVita's nutritional products."'
H. Genericness
1. Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc.
In Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc.,'6 Frito-
Lay filed a Notice of Opposition against Princeton Vanguard's
application on the Principal Register for PRETZEL CRISPS for
"pretzel crackers," arguing that PRETZEL CRISPS is generic for
pretzel crackers and, in the alternative, is highly descriptive of a type
159. Id. at 874.
160. Id. at 875.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 420 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that Aloe Crkme could not
appropriate the generic and descriptive term "Aloe" for its products that contain aloe
as the distinguishing ingredient and, thus, could not acquire trademark rights in its
ALOE CREME mark without a showing of secondary meaning).
164. In re TVita, Inc., 783 F.3d at 875-76.
165. Id. at 876.
166. 786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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of cracker product.1 7  Frito-Lay also filed a Petition to Cancel
Princeton Vanguard's registration for PRETZEL CRISPS on the
Supplemental Register, and the two proceedings were later
consolidated.' Both parties moved for summary judgment.' The
Board denied both motions, and the case proceeded to trial.7 e
After reviewing all of the evidence, the Board sustained Frito-Lay's
opposition and granted its Petition for Cancellation, finding that
"pretzel" was generic when used in connection with pretzel snacks.7 1
The TTAB noted that it gave "controlling weight" to dictionary
definitions of "PRETZEL" and "CRISPS," evidence of use by the
public, and evidence of Princeton Vanguard's use of the mark to
reach its decision.'72  Because it found PRETZEL CRISPS to be
generic, the Board never reached the question of whether PRETZEL
CRISPS had acquired distinctiveness.'73
Princeton Vanguard appealed, arguing that the Board erred in its
genericness analysis by analyzing PRETZEL CRISPS as a compound
term comprised of two different words instead of a unitary
phrase.77 The Federal Circuit agreed with Princeton Vanguard
and vacated and remanded the case with instructions for the TTAB
to apply the correct standard. 175
The Federal Circuit found that the TTAB applied the incorrect
legal standard for assessing genericness and reiterated the test for
genericness 176 that it established in H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v.
International Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc."' Specifically, to determine a
mark's genericness, the TTAB must engage in a two-step inquiry: "First,
what is the genus of goods or services at issue? Second, is the term
167. Id. at 962-63.




172. Id. at 964.
173. Id.
174. Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 964
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
175. Id. at 964, 966, 971.
176. Id. at 966.
177. 782 F.2d 987, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (determining that the "common
descriptive name" of goods or services is its generic term, which cannot be registered
as a trademark).
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sought to be registered or retained on the register understood by the
relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services?" '7
In applying the second prong, the Federal Circuit held that the
TTAB incorrectly adjusted its genericness analysis based on whether
the mark was a compound term or a phrase."' According to the
Board, compound terms must be analyzed under the Gould standard
that looks at "evidence of the meaning of the constituent words."18 0
However, for marks that are phrases, the Board found that it "must
conduct an inquiry into the meaning of the disputed phrase as a
whole""' under the standard established in In re American Fertility
Society."' However, the Federal Circuit dismissed the TTAB's analysis,
holding that "the test for genericness is the same, regardless of
whether the mark is a compound term or a phrase."' The court
explained that the TTAB must analyze the mark as a whole to
determine whether the public understands the mark to be generic,
including consideration of record evidence of the public's
understanding of the mark.'
The Federal Circuit reviewed the record and found it replete with
evidence of the public's understanding of the mark, including survey
evidence and evidence of use of PRETZEL CRISPS in the
marketplace.' In its instructions for remand, the court reminded the
Board that it must carefully consider the surveys of record and explain
its decision for disregarding them."' On September 24, 2015, the
proceedings resumed at the TTAB and the TTAB requested re-briefing
on the evidence that the Federal Circuit focused on in its decision.'87
178. Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d at 965 (quoting Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 990).
179. Id. at 966.
180. Id. at 965-66 (citing In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
181. Id. at 966 (quoting In re Am. Fertility Soc'y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (holding that the TTAB should not only cite dictionary definitions and third-
party uses of the constituent terms of the phrase "SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE," but must also conduct an inquiry into the public's understanding of the
meaning of the disputed phrase as a whole)).
182. 188 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
183. Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d at 966.
184. Id. at 968.
185. Id. at 970.
186. Id. at 970-71.
187. Frito-Lay North Am., Inc. v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC, No. 92053001, at 2
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 24, 2015).
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VIII.PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Beling v. Ennis, Inc.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Beling v. Ennis, Inc.' involved
both procedural and substantive determinations. In that case, Ennis,
Inc. owned a federal trademark registration for the COLORWORX
and design mark (shown in Figure 7 below) for "printing services"
and filed an opposition against Joel Beling's intent-to-use application
for the word mark COLOR WARS, alleging a likelihood of
confusion."' Beling filed counterclaims arguing that Ennis's
COLORWORX mark was merely descriptive, generic, and
fraudulently procured.'
Figure 7. Ennis's Mark in Issue in Beling v. Ennis, Inc.
OLORWORx
The parties each filed motions for summary judgment in the
cancellation proceeding.'9 2 The TTAB granted Ennis's motion,
sustaining the opposition against Beling's mark on the ground of
likelihood of confusion.' The Board denied Beling's motion and
dismissed the counterclaims for cancellation on the grounds of
descriptiveness, genericness, and fraud with prejudice, finding that
Beling failed to support its counterclaims with probative evidence
showing the public's perception of Ennis's mark. 194
In its review of the case, the Federal Circuit focused its analysis on
the evidence that Beling produced, including web pages and USPTO
records.' The court found that Beling had not met its heavy burden
188. 613 F. App'x 924 (Fed. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 406 (2015).
189. Id. at 924-25.





195. Id. at 926.
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of proof for the fraud claim because it produced no evidence to show
that Ennis actually knew third-party COLORWORX and
COLORWORKS marks existed at the time of the application.1 6 On
the genericness claim, the Federal Circuit found that Beling
submitted no evidence showing that the relevant public would
understand Ennis's mark to be generic or merely descriptive."9
B. In re Louisiana Fish Fry Products, Ltd.
In In re Louisiana Fish Fry Products, Ltd.,' the Federal Circuit
affirmed the TTAB's refusal to register the applicant's mark
LOUISIANA FISH FRY PRODUCTS BRING THE TASTE OF
LOUISIANA HOME! (shown in Figure 8 below) absent a disclaimer
of LOUISIANA FISH FRY PRODUCTS, finding that the applicant
failed to establish that is mark had acquired distinctiveness.'
Figure 8. Mark in Issue in In re Louisiana Fish Fry Products, Ltd.20
The Examining Attorney refused to register the mark without a
disclaimer of FISH FRY PRODUCTS because the term is generic and,
therefore, not independently registrable."o' Specifically, the
Examining Attorney asserted that FISH FRY PRODUCTS is generic
and, in the alternative, that the term was at least "highly descriptive,"
but that the applicant failed to show the mark had acquired
distinctiveness because the sales figures and advertising evidence
196. Id. at 925-26.
197. Id. at 927.
198. 797 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
199. Id. at 1337.
200. Id. at 1334.
201. Id. at 1334, 1337.
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submitted only related to the term LOUISIANA FISH FRY
PRODUCTS and not specifically to FISH FRY PRODUCTS.202
The TTAB affirmed the Examining Attorney's refusal, finding that
FISH FRY PRODUCTS is generic because the relevant public
understands FISH FRY PRODUCTS to "identify a type of sauce,
marinade or spice used for fish fries" and "fish fry" and "products" to
keep their "generic significance" even when combined.2" The Board
also held that Louisiana Fish Fry failed to prove that the term
acquired distinctiveness.204
The Federal Circuit affirmed on appeal, finding that Louisiana Fish
Fry did not establish that FISH FRY PRODUCTS had acquired
distinctiveness.20 ' As evidence, Louisiana Fish Fry provided two
declarations from its president, one of which said that FISH FRY
PRODUCTS became distinctive through Louisiana Fish Fry's
"'substantially exclusive and continuous use' of the mark for at least
the last five years."20 ' The court said that section 2(f) permits, but
does not require, the PTO to accept five years of such use as prima
facie evidence of acquired distinctiveness.20 ' Therefore, the TTAB
acted within its discretion when it did not accept Louisiana Fish Fry's
alleged five years of use as prima facie evidence, "especially for a
mark that is as highly descriptive [as] 'FISH FRY PRODUCTS."'
20 s
Moreover, under 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a), the PTO can condition the
registration of a mark on the applicant's disclaimer of an
"unregistrable component of a mark."o20  The court explained that it
did not need to reach the TTAB's genericness determination,210 as
the applicant did not disclaim the highly descriptive term "FISH FRY
PRODUCTS" and did not demonstrate that term had acquired
distinctiveness." Louisiana Fish Fry also submitted its other registrations
that included the term LOUISIANA FISH FRY, but the court said that
202. Id. at 1334.
203. Id. at 1335.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1336-37.
206. Id. at 1336.
207. Id. at 1336-37 (citing Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012)).
208. Id. at 1337.
209. Id. at 1335.
210. Id. at 1336.
211. Id.
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"the Board correctly determined that none of these marks indicate that
FISH FRY PRODUCTS has acquired distinctiveness."21 2
Judge Pauline Newman, although concurring in the court's
judgment, would have affirmed the refusal on the ground that
Louisiana Fish Fry "should disclaim any exclusive right to 'fish fry
products' because the term is the generic and common descriptive
name for these products."2 13
C. Staub Design, LLC v. Carnivale
Staub Design, LLC v. Carnivale2 14 involved a protracted fight over the
mark "THE AFFORDABLE HOUSE." In 1994, Mr. Carnivale
published a book about architectural plans and specifications using
the title THE AFFORDABLE HOUSE and obtained a registration for
the mark.1 In addition, Mr. Carnivale registered the domain name
www.affordablehouse.com in 1998.
After discovering Mr. Carnivale's website, Staub, a residential
design company, registered the domain name
www.theaffordablehouse.com in 2004.1 Mr. Carnivale sent a cease
and desist letter to Staub in 2007, and Staub, in turn, petitioned to
cancel Mr. Carnivale's mark, alleging fraud and that the mark was
generic. Shortly after the cancellation proceeding was instituted,
Mr. Carnivale filed a civil action against Staub in district court alleging
Staub's use of the www.theaffordablehouse.com domain name violated
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) .219 The
district court eventually found that Staub violated the ACPA and that
Mr. Carnivale's mark was distinctive, not generic.220
The Board put the cancellation proceeding on hold during the
pendency of the civil case.22 ' At the same time that Mr. Carnivale
notified the TTAB of the civil case, he also filed a motion to
212. Id. at 1337.
213. Id. at 1337-38 (NewmanJ., concurring).
214. 625 F. App'x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
215. Id. at 994.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 994-95.
219. Id. at 995; see Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), Pub. L.
No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545-52 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et
seq. (2012)).
220. Staub Design, 625 F. App'x at 995.
221. Id.
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dismiss.222  After the district court proceeding concluded, Staub
moved to amend its petition for cancellation to remove the fraud
claim and add an allegation that Mr. Carnivale's mark was merely
descriptive.223 The Board allowed the amendment, but granted Mr.
Carnivale's motion to dismiss.22 ' The TTAB found, under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel,225 that Staub had already litigated and
lost the distinctiveness argument in the context of the ACPA claim
during the district court proceeding, and was therefore precluded from
raising the genericness argument during the cancellation proceeding. 221
Staub appealed the Board's decision to the Federal Circuit.227 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board's legal conclusions de
novo and the factual findings for substantial evidence.22" The court
affirmed the Board's decision that Staub was precluded from re-
litigating the issue of distinctiveness "It]o the extent that Staub's
petition [for cancellation] concerned the same issue of whether Mr.
Carnivale's mark was distinctive and not generic in 2004.",221 In
rejecting Staub's argument that it should not be precluded from
raising the distinctiveness issue again because the district court's
finding was limited to distinctiveness at the time of Staub's
registration of its domain name, the Federal Circuit noted that Staub
presented no evidence of changed circumstances that would support
its genericness claim.2 so
D. Edge Systems LLC v. Aguila
In Edge Systems LLC v. Aguila,"3 the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida entered a preliminary injunction against
Aguila based on infringement of Edge Systems' patent, trademark,




225. Staub Design, LLC v. Carnivale, No. 92047553, at 9 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2014)
(explaining that under this doctrine, one court's final disposition of an issue
prevents the parties from presenting the same issue to another court in a subsequent
suit).
226. Id. at 10-11; Staub, 625 F. App'x at 995.
227. Staub, 625 F. App'x at 995.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 996.
231. No. 2015-1507, 2015 WL 9267529 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21, 2015) (per curiam).
232. Id. at *1.
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appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed after reviewing the
district court's decision for abuse of discretion.2 11
The Magistrate Judge at the district court reviewed evidence from
both parties to assess Edge's trademark infringement claim and
Aguila's laches defense.2 " The Magistrate Judge found that Aguila
offered no timely or credible evidence to refute Edge's prima facie
case of infringement, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding there
was no abuse of discretion because the Magistrate's "decision to
exclude the untimely evidence was consistent with his order and the
local evidentiary rules.""' In addition, the Magistrate found, and the
Federal Circuit affirmed, that Aguila failed to properly apply the legal
framework of the laches defense to the particular facts and
circumstances of his case."' Similarly, regarding the trade dress
claims, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Magistrate Judge's finding
that Aguila had not offered any argument to support his claim that
he was the first to use the trade dress in question."
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit was particularly active in the area of trademark
law in 2015. Not only did the Federal Circuit issue a large number of
precedential trademark decisions, it also sat en banc in a trademark
case for the first time in many years, overturning a decades-old
precedent regarding the Lanham Act's implication of First
Amendment protections. Trademark practitioners should watch out
for more First Amendment-related cases that result from the Federal
Circuit's decision in Tam III, as it will likely have long-lasting effects
on trademark prosecution and litigation.
233. Id. at *1, *7, *8, *10.
234. Id. at *6-8.
235. Id. at *7 (explaining that the evidence was untimely because Aguila
submitted it several weeks after the evidentiary hearing).
236. Id. at *8.
237. Id. at *9-10.
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